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Family history « Top of the Campops: 60 things you didn't know about family, marriage, work, and death since the middle ages

Top of the Campops: 60 things you didn't know about family, marriage, work, and death since the middle ages

Posts Tagged ‘Family history’

Chinese genealogies are different

Thursday, September 5th, 2024

Ying Dai

People’s keen interest in exploring their family trees, as evidenced by the popularity of websites like Ancestry.com, is not just a modern Western phenomenon but also has deep historical roots in China. Unlike Western genealogies that track lineage through both paternal and maternal lines starting from the individual upwards (see “What a big family you have, Grandma!), Chinese genealogies typically begin with a common ancestor and document all descendants downwards. This key difference reflects the distinct roles of genealogies in each culture. In the West, genealogical research is often driven by personal curiosity, whereas in China, it has significant socioeconomic functions, deeply intertwined with the transformation of the country. 

Illustration of western and Chinese genealogies. Drawn by author.

From imperial roots to modern revival 

Chinese genealogical records, originally reserved for royal and noble families, gained broader societal importance during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1636–1912) dynasties. During this era, lineages were crucial for collaboration in business and the organisation of villages. The lineages owned collective properties, established business networks, and supported education and poor relief. The practice of documenting lineage membership based on common descent was crucial here, leading to widespread compilation and updates of genealogies across wider society. 

A Chinese family sit around a small cooking stove eating by the side of the road. Coloured lithograph after W. Alexander. Wellcome Collection.

In the first seven decades of the 20th century, these genealogies were criticized as part of a patriarchal ‘old culture’ that was believed to have resulted in China’s ‘backwardness’. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, with the dominance of class and collectivism in social organisation, the lineage lost many of its traditional socio-economic roles. As a result, the practice of compiling and maintaining genealogies significantly diminished. 

In the 1980s, China saw a revival in the practice of compiling genealogies. The reintroduction of market institutions reemphasized the importance of blood and marital ties, both within the country and between domestic and overseas Chinese. Economic progress enabled more families to afford the compilation, maintenance, or updating of their genealogical records. This revival reflects a renewed appreciation for China’s traditional values. 

Both photos depict contemporary genealogies. The photo on the left features genealogies bound in traditional covers, whereas the one on the right displays genealogies in modern book formats. Photographed by the author at Zhejiang Library.

Tradition partially transformed 

The revival of genealogy compilation is not a return to tradition. Two main trends characterize this new generation of Chinese genealogies:

  1. Occupational information is documented more comprehensively. Traditionally, only notable individuals had their occupations recorded, but now, some of the new genealogies captured the occupational information of ordinary workers like peasants, petty businessmen, and factory workers. The comprehensive recording of occupations in the new genealogies sometimes serves merely to keep a fuller record of lineage members. However, it often reflects a deliberate intent to change traditional practices that highlighted only distinguished individuals. A notable example is the genealogy of the Yang Lineage in Jiangsu, in which “lineage members are all equally included with their biographies so as to change the old norm of making biographies for the [distinct] minority. 
  2. Womens information is recorded much more comprehensively. Traditional genealogies typically traced only male descendants, answering the question Who is my father’s father’s father’s … father? However, a small proportion of the new genealogies now track female descendants and their offspring for one to three generations, allowing some individuals to know Who is my mother’s … mother? Furthermore, female lineage members were now given individual entries, instead of being listed under their fathers or husbands’ names, and the contents of women’s entries also begun to align with those of mens. 

Registration form of the Qian Lineage for genealogy compilation. Provided by Xiaoqin Qian.

The new trends reflect modern values of occupational and gender equality. However, the transformation of traditional genealogies is only partial. For instance, only about two per cent of the new genealogies I reviewed have comprehensive occupational records. It is also notable that the documentation of women’s information remains less comprehensive compared to men, and female descendants’ offspring are tracked for fewer generations.

Understanding social transformation through genealogies 

Despite the partial nature of the transformation, comparisons of the occupational and educational data from the genealogies and censuses for the Yangtze Valley, where more than 40 percent of the national population resided, suggest that genealogies could broadly represent the wider population. The new generation of genealogies allows us to understand the social structural transformations of China in the 20th century, which witnessed devastating wars, radical political revolutions, and, recently, very rapid economic development that lifted hundreds of millions from dire poverty. 

The Yangtze Valley and the distribution of individuals with occupational records from genealogies the author collected. Drawn by author.

In 1982, 74 percent of China’s labour force was employed in agriculture. By 2020, this figure had dropped to 21 percent, with the majority shifting to manufacturing and services. This is the fastest economic and social structural transformation ever identified in world history.

Genealogical data from the Yangtze Valley highlights several key aspects of this shift.

  • Occupational change over a lifetime: For those born before the 1940s, agriculture was the destination of most people who changed their occupations. But for those born after the 1940s, it became more common for peasants to move into non-agricultural occupations. 
  • Dual occupations: A large number of peasants participated in non-agricultural production, playing significant roles in industries such as construction and the production of building materials and woodwork. 
  • Household labour division: Alongside the more traditional arrangement where the husband works outside the home while the wife manages agricultural production, it has become increasingly common for both partners to leave their home to work in non-agricultural sectors while the elderly remain behind to farm and look after the children. 
  • Intergenerational occupational mobility: The linked genealogical data of the Qian lineage from Lower Yangtze suggest that out of the 448 male peasants born in the 1940s, only 32 (seven percent) of their 499 male descendants continued to work in agriculture, while 467 (93 percent) shifted to non-agricultural sectors. 

The illustration shows occupational mobility between generations, occupational changes over the life time (separated by ‘->’), dual occupations (separated by ‘&’), and gender difference. Drawn by the author based on the genealogy of the Li Lineage in Yunnan province.

Chinese genealogies also contain individual biographies detailing the working experiences of a broad social spectrum. The quantitative and qualitative evidence in these genealogies can finally allow us to understand the working lives of 20th-century China from the perspectives of both macro structures and micro experiences. 

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Further reading

Y. Dai, Lineage genealogies as a new source for researching the occupational structure of twentieth-century China: Tradition (partially) transformed, Historical Methods, XXX.  

What a big family you have, Grandma!

Thursday, August 1st, 2024

Alice Reid & Jim Oeppen

Looking backwards in time gives a mistaken impression that family sizes in the past were larger than they actually were. This blog explains why this happens, and explores the differences between the picture of the past painted by genealogies and the past as it actually was. 

Looking backwards at our families 

Alice’s grandmother, Margaret, had six children, of whom five survived to adulthood. She had 14 grandchildren and (so far) 25 great-grandchildren. She also had two sisters, Kathleen and Moira. Moira had two children, four grandchildren and six great grandchildren. Kathleen remained single and childless throughout her life. On average, the three sisters (Margaret, Kathleen and Moira) had 2.7 children apiece.  

Kathleen, Moira and Margaret with their mother Agnes (also known as Nan) in 1929. Family photograph, courtesy of Colin Reid.

Of the seven offspring in the next generation who survived to adulthood, five of them came from a family of six, and two from a family of two. If you were to gather them all in a room and ask how many children their mothers had (imagine they were not related and therefore did not worry about whether or not siblings should all answer the question), the answer would be 4.9 children The view from the children’s point of view is very different, because there are more of Margaret’s children to remember their big family. The fact that Kathleen had no children means that her family size (of zero) cannot be represented in a calculation of mothers’ family size as reported by children. 

In the next generation the difference is larger still, with the grandchildren’s point of view suggesting that their grandmothers’ generation had 5.2 children on average, nearly double the real number of 2.7. 

Looking back at previous generations of our own families can therefore give an inflated view of how large family sizes were in the past, and can produce distorted impressions of families and family formation. 

Alice’s grandmother Margaret (centre), with her surviving children and her husband. Family photograph, courtesy of Colin Reid.

Family history and genealogy 

Demography takes a “descendant” viewpointThe average family size is calculated from the mother’s viewpoint – the 2.7 children in the example above, not the ascendant 5.2By contrast almost all genealogies are ascendant: i.e. a survivor works backwards, recording the generations in their main line of ascent. (Descendant genealogies select a person in the past and follow their kin forward in time – a future blog will discuss Chinese genealogies, which are usually descendant.)  The extent to which a genealogist follows collateral kin in each generation, such as aunts and uncles etc., is variable – depending on the available records and enthusiasm.   

Campop’s work on reconstructing the demography of English families allows us to calculate the ascendant bias in family size from 1550 to 1850 (i.e. the extent to which ascendant genealogies overstate family sizes). The simple formula that links the averages for the ascendant and descendant views has been known for over a century.  

To simplify the picture, we start by removing the effect of celibacy (women remaining unmarried) and mortality. Assume that every woman married, and both she and her husband survived to at least her 50th birthday. The descendant average number of children over the period varied between about four and six children, but the ascendant view adds 1.5 to two extra children. This is like comparing the average number of children from Margaret and Moira (four) with the average from their children’s point of view (5.2). 

Including women such as Kathleen in the example above, who did not marry or have children increases this bias still further. Celibacy in the past among females surviving to age 50 is thought to have been about 10-15 percent. Adding these women with no descendants to the calculation raises the ascendant bias to about 2.5 children. Similar biases have been found for Basque villages 1800-1969, Brazil 1960-2000, France 1830-1896, the USA 1867-1955, and a variety of late 20th century, high fertility populations.  

Genealogy showing the descendants of Adam and Eve (London, 1611). British Library C.35.l.13.(2).

So, women with descendants, who are more likely to appear in genealogies, are not typical of women in general. Their experience should not be used to characterise the experience of the overall population.

Nevertheless, these women with descendants did exist, and it is also worth considering how they managed to fit larger than average numbers of children into their child-bearing histories. 

The maximum reproductive span for a woman is 35 years (between the ages of 15 and 50). But women in the British past were aged about 25 when they married for the first time (see blog on marriage), and the typical age at last birth in a non-contracepting population of women surviving to age 50 is 41 years, reducing the average fertile period to 26 years.

Tony Wrigley and colleagues at Campop calculated that average inter-birth intervals were 2.5 years: typical of a population with long breast-feeding. Thus, women in an ascendant genealogy would need an extra 6.25 years of reproduction. They must have married young, lived to 50, or had short birth-intervals (or multiple births), or all three. 

Children born to Andrew and Janet Gray, great great grandparents of Agnes (Nan) in the photograph above. Janet’s young age at marriage, survival beyond age 50, and very short birth-intervals enabled her to have 16 singleton births. Image courtesy of Colin Reid.

How do we know? 

This knowledge uses ‘family reconstitution’: the reconstruction of families by linking the baptisms, marriages, and burials recorded in parish registers. This process starts with a marriage and locates the baptisms of bride and groom to establish their birth dates and age at marriage. The births of their children are identified, enabling the age of the mother at birth to be calculated. Finally, the deaths of husband and wife are located in the records, yielding age at death.  

The same process is undertaken for the marriages of each of the children of the original couple, making inter-generational comparisons possible. Campop created a number of family reconstitutions for a variety of communities across England. These have to be treated very carefully to yield accurate demographic measures, but they are our best source of information about the population of England between the mid-16th and mid-19th centuries. 

The bias in ascendant genealogies can be calculated by comparing the average number of children per woman using all women in the population (the descending point of view), with the sibship sizes of those women who had children. In other words, by performing a similar comparison to the example in the first section of this blog.

Further reading 

E. A. Wrigley, R.S. Davies, J.E. Oeppen, and R.S. Schofield, English Population History from Family Reconstitution, 1580–1837 (Cambridge University Press, 1997).

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Why was high family size in the British past so low?

Thursday, July 18th, 2024

Alice Reid

Today most of the world’s population lives in places where, on average, women have fewer than two children over their lifetime, but this level of childbearing is a relatively recent phenomenon.

Before the demographic transition the change from high and variable birth and death rates to low birth and death rates (usually taken as 1870-1930 in the UK) women had higher numbers of children, and it is generally accepted that they did not deliberately restrict the numbers of children they had.

Given that before the demographic transition in other parts of the world, women had an average of around six or seven children, it is surprising that British women have never had more than five children, on average, over the course of their lifetime.  

Sir Thomas Remington of Lund in the East Riding of the County of York, Knight, Dame Hannah his wife, daughter of Sir William Gee of Bishop Burton, Knight, and their issue. 1647. Image courtesy of York Museums Trust. Public Domain.

How high is high fertility? 

Theoretically a woman could fit in over 30 children during a roughly 30-year reproductive period between menarche and menopause. Although there are instances of individual women having between 20 and 30 children – for example Sir Thomas and Lady Remmington of Lund in Yorkshire, illustrated in the image above with their 20 children – this is very unusual, and there are very few societies, past or present, where the average number of children per woman exceeds eight. The highest documented fertility of any community is associated with the Hutterites, a small North American religious sect, where in the mid-20th century women had an average of 8.9 children.  

There are a number of physiological and behavioural factors which can reduce the number of children born to each woman. These include miscarriage and stillbirth (which are generally not included in calculations of birth rates); the fact that some women lose the ability to conceive earlier than average through birth complications, disease, or early menopause; the fact that new mothers generally do not ovulate for some months after the birth of a child, and the longer and more intensively they breastfeed, the longer it takes for ovulation to return; and the fact that if the timing of sexual intercourse is random, couples might miss their fertile window in some months.

These factors together tend to reduce the number of children an average woman might have even if she was in a sexual relationship throughout her childbearing years, and not using any form of contraception, to around eight children.

Marriage patterns reduced fertility in historic Britain 

Time spent outside sexual relationships reduces fertility still further in populations where no or few couples were trying to prevent conception, and this is the major factor reducing fertility levels in historic Britain. Before the demographic transition, when mortality was still relatively high, the death of either a woman or her husband would curtail her opportunity to have children.

More important for reducing numbers of children born in England and Wales to levels lower than many other parts of the world, however, were late ages at marriage and substantial proportions of women who never married. 

Although sexual intercourse outside marriage did happen in the British past, most children were born to married couples until well into the last quarter of the 20th century (watch out for future blogs on this topic).

Photo from E. W. Hope, Report on the physical welfare of mothers and children (Liverpool, The Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, 1917), volume 1.

Both late ages at marriage and a substantial portion of the population who never married have the ability to considerably reduce the number of children born to a woman. We saw in a previous blog that the age of first marriage in England ranged between 24 and 26 until the post-2WW marriage boom, when women married younger than ever before. Given that the chance of conceiving reduces with age, particularly beyond the age of 30 or so, relatively late age at marriage means that women spent many of the most fertile years of their life unmarried and therefore with little chance of becoming pregnant. 

In addition, a relatively high percentage of women (on average 13.5 percent) remained unmarried throughout their childbearing lives. When age at marriage was higher, more women never married at all, with as many of 27 percent of women born in the mid17th century remaining single at age 50. There were very few time periods when less than five percent of women remained unmarried, and this occurred when age at marriage was low, for example among women born in the mid 18th century.  

In contrast in most South Asian countries (e.g. India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan) until the 1980s women married before age 20 and only one or two percent remained unmarried at age 50. These differences in marriage patterns are the main reason for considerably higher average numbers of children per woman before the demographic transition in South Asia than in Britain (and other parts of North-West Europe where marriage patterns were similar). 

Fertility levels and population growth 

Populations grow when there are more births than deaths (not counting the influence of migration). The relationship between fertility in terms of the number of children per woman and the number of births per 1,000 people is not a simple one, as it also depends on the age structure of the population. High fertility in the recent past can produce large cohorts of women in the childbearing ages, and these can contribute to a high number of births in relation to deaths even if the number of children each woman has is low.  

Nevertheless, there is a widely used measure – the ‘replacement rate’ – that indicates the number of children a woman needs to have to ‘replace herself’ and therefore keep the population from either growing or shrinking. Globally, today, this number is around 2.1; just over two because although around half of all children born are female, slightly more children born are male, and also because not all children reach adulthood.  

In the past, however, this number was considerably higher, principally because mortality was higher, so more children needed to be born in order to ensure that one female born survived to childbearing age. Therefore although women had between four and five children each in Britain, this did not mean the population grew rapidly. For most of the pre-industrial period, the British population grew slowly, if at all, because fertility and mortality were more or less in balance.  

Painting of five children.

Unknown artist, Five Children of the Pigott Family (1740). Courtesy York Museums Trust.

Moderate fertility as part of a low-pressure regime 

In other pre-demographic transition populations with low population growth, higher fertility levels were accompanied by higher mortality levels. When Tony Wrigley and Roger Schofield at Campop produced the long-run series of fertility and mortality for England, they suggested that this was part of a ‘lowpressure’ demographic regime. Such a regime was characterised by moderate levels of both fertility and mortality, with low fertility achieved through marriage as described above. In contrast, ‘highpressure’ regimes were characterised by higher levels of both fertility and mortality

How do we know?

Fertility, or birth rates, can be measured in a number of different ways. The simplest measure is the crude birth rate, the number of births in the population in a year, per 1000 people. This is easy to calculate, particularly since the state started to register births (1837 in England and Wales and 1855 in Scotland).  

However, this blog has talked mainly about a different measure, the total fertility rate, which is defined as the number of children each woman could expect to have over the course of her childbearing life. We can measure this for actual cohorts of women (women born in particular years) by waiting until they reach the age of around 50, when further childbearing is unlikely, and counting the numbers of their children.

However, this means it is necessary to wait until a cohort has reached the age of 50, as it is not possible to derive this information from birth certificates. Instead most total fertility rates are ‘period’ rates, calculated by calculating fertility rates for age groups of women (numbers of children born to women in a particular age group and dividing by the number of women) and assuming that women go through their childbearing life experiencing those rates in sequence.  

Period total fertility rates can be calculated for England and Wales since 1938, when the age of the mother started to be recorded on birth certificates. Between 1851 and 1938 they have to be estimated. Here we have estimated them from census data by working out the age at childbirth of women living with their children and making various adjustments for children who died or were not living with their mother (this technique is called the own children method). 

For the pre-industrial period, total fertility can be estimated from parish registers which recorded baptisms, marriages and burials. Linking the births to different women, and to her own baptism, allows agespecific fertility rates to be constructed, and the numbers of births to women across their lives can be counted 

Photograph taken 1900 © Reproduced by permission of Oxfordshire County Council

Further reading

Bongaarts, J. (1975) Why High Birth Rates Are So Low. Population and Development Review, 1(2): 289-296. 

Wrigley, E.A. and R.S. Schofield (1989) The Population History of England 1541-1871. CUP. 

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What was the size of the English population before the first census in 1801 – and how do we know?

Thursday, July 11th, 2024

Jim Oeppen

Campop’s estimated series of population totals for England from 1541 to 1871 are the longest and most detailed available for any country. The associated age-structures have been used to provide summary measures of fertility and mortality, such as replacement rates and life expectancyThe opportunity they present for extending per capita analysis into the past means that they have become a standard reference for historical demography and economic history, and have been cited in over 1,500 academic publications. 

Why do we need to calculate population size?  

Expressing data “per capita” is an essential part of how we understand social and economic statistics today, but this kind of calculation relies on knowing the population total.  Before 1860, the term “per capita” was extremely rare(Try typing “per capita” or “per person” into Google Books Ngram Viewer.)  

This is not surprising when you consider that there was no census of England and Wales before 1801, and age-breakdowns only began in 1821. Part of the rationale for taking the first census was that politicians couldn’t decide whether the population was increasing or decreasingIt is surprising that they didn’t know, as we now know that the population was increasing very rapidly! 

So how do we calculate historical population size without a census? 

In the absence of census data before 1801, Campop’s population estimates are derived from annual counts of baptisms and burials. After adjustment, these can be used as proxies for births and deathsOfficial registration of births, deaths, and marriages began in 1837, but the established Church in England had been registering baptisms, marriages, and burials since 1538.   

Ascension parish burial ground Cambridge. Source: Wikimedia.

Campop encouraged their army of volunteers to find local parish registers and count the events in each month. The initial aim was not to estimate the population, but to find registers without gaps that might be suitable for Family Reconstitution (a technique for the detailed analysis of family demography).  

However, once the counts started coming in, it became apparent that they were an important resource in their own right. It was decided that they could be used as a sample that could be inflated to represent national estimates of births, marriages and deaths. 

A total of 404 parishes were identified that satisfied a suite of criteria for accuracy and completeness. These represent a four percent sample of the 10,000 ancient English parishes. They provide 3.7 million baptisms, marriages, and burials in monthly totals.  

Problems and adjustments 

These 404 parishes were not a random sample. The biggest issues were that large parishes were over-represented; there were no London parishes; and the series started and stopped at different dates.  For example, between 1662 and 1811 all 404 parishes were in observation, but in earlier and later years the number declined. 

Going from baptisms and burials to “national” totals of births and deaths involved a long series of adjustments. These included inflating the births to allow for deaths before baptism; and adding under-counted non-Conformist births and events for London. Finally, the sample was re-weighted so that the large parishes lost their dominance in the counts.    

Validating the estimation method 

Sweden has records of deaths by age, censuses, and life tables from 1751It also has high levels of net-outmigration in the 19th centuryWe can pretend we don’t know about the censuses, and only use the totals of births and deaths with the 1901 census as targets. The estimation method was able to satisfactorily match the observed censuses from 1751 onwards, and the net-migration rates. 

The estimated values for English life expectancy derived from totals of births and deaths are remarkably consistent with those derived from subsequent research on individual life histories in Campop’s English Family Reconstitution studies.  

Figure 1 (below) shows Campop’s estimates of the population of England from 1536 to 1796, together with the decadal Census counts for England from 1801. The period from 1541 to 1651 exhibits rapid exponential growth, followed by a period of stagnation, before exponential growth returns in the 19th century, but with a slower rate after 1901. The population doubling time was about a century in the first growth period, but became even more rapid in the 19th century, shortening to 50 years. 

Findings

Using this information, Campop members were able to make a series of discoveries about populations in the past, including:

Dependency ratio 

A historical definition of the working age population is between the ages of 15 and 60, with those older and younger regarded as ‘dependent’.  Although there have been changes as the population grew and stagnated, and these changes had important social and economic consequences, the Dependency Ratio hovered around 70 dependents per 100 providers from 1551 to 2021. This stability masks an important transition. Before 1900 there were five children for every elderly dependent. The 20th century saw this fall to one child for each elderly person.  

Georgios Iakovidis, The Favourite (1890). Source: Wikimedia

Net migration 

The net-migration estimates show consistent out-migration at the low rate of about one to two persons per thousand per annum. It is likely that in-migrants, particularly from Scotland, Ireland and Wales, almost balanced English emigration to the rest of the world. 

Fertility and life expectancy 

The pre-census population estimates can be used to derive demographic measures of fertility and survival from 1551 to 1841.  For example, we found that women who survived to age 50 only had about five births on average, which is very different from typical expectations about the past – look out for a blog post about this next week! 

Life-expectancy at birth derived from these populations was generally between 30 and 40 years, but around 20-25% of people were aged 40+.  If you wonder how this can be possible, it will be discussed in the forthcoming blog “Three Score and Ten”.

Population dynamics 

From these estimates, we can see that the impact of epidemics on England’s population has been minor and transitory. From 1541 to 1851, changes in fertility were more important than changes in survival in determining population growth.  The importance of age at marriage as a factor influencing fertility is discussed in another of today’s blogs

Further reading 

HMD. Human Mortality Database. Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany), University of California, Berkeley (USA), and French Institute for Demographic Studies (France). Available at www.mortality.org

R. D. Lee, “Estimating Series of Vital Rates and Age Structures from Baptisms and Burials: A New Technique with Applications to Pre-industrial England,” Population Studies, 28 (1974), pp. 495-512.

E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield, The Population History of England 1541-1871: a reconstruction (Cambridge University Press, 1981).

E. A. Wrigley, R. S. Davies, J. E. Oeppen, and R. S. Schofield, English Population History from Family Reconstitution: 1580-1837 (Cambridge University Press, 1997).

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