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mortality « Top of the Campops: 60 things you didn't know about family, marriage, work, and death since the middle ages

Top of the Campops: 60 things you didn't know about family, marriage, work, and death since the middle ages

Posts Tagged ‘mortality’

How scarce were the elderly in the British past?

Thursday, October 10th, 2024

Richard Smith

Eugenio Zampighi, ‘Elderly Couple Reading‘. Beamish, The North of England Open Air Museum.

Today those aged 60 and over make up slightly more than 1 in 5 of the UK population. It is tempting to believe that in the distant past, because there were fewer older people, they enjoyed a greater cachet. But how far is this view born out in the English case by the findings of historical demography? Is it correct to regard age structures over the deeper past as unvarying through time? 

Baptisms and burials recorded in English parish registers between 1538 and 1837, when added to information in censuses that become available in the 19th century, enable us to derive an age structure of the population extending from 1541 to the present day.Figure 1 (below) shows the proportion of the population aged 60 and above across almost five centuries of English historyThe elderly as a proportion of the total population ranged between 6 and 10 percent from 1541 until 1931, thereafter experiencing a steady rise to reach 22 percent today. No other country is in possession of a time series of such length. 

The relative roles of fertility and mortality 

It is important to draw a distinction between individual ageing and population ageing. Individual ageing refers to the process of individuals growing older, but our focus here is on the proportion of the total population in old age.   

It may seem counter-intuitive to discover that over a substantial part of the period shown in Figure 1, it has been changes in fertility, and not overall life expectancy, that have been the principal influence on the proportion of the population aged over 60.   

The level of fertility, and to a lesser extent the level of infant mortality, determine the number of persons injected into the base of the population pyramid. These cohorts then move up through the pyramid over time, and their overall size will determine the total age structure. Hence it is not the capacity to survive to ages over 60 that determines the proportion of elderly people, but rather changes in the size of generations available to survive 

Albrecht Durer, ‘An Young and Old Woman from Bergen op Zoom‘ (1520).

Problematic templates for the study of ageing in the past 

It was often claimed that in the deeper past, the elderly possessed a ‘scarcity value’: that because they constituted a particularly low proportion of the population, a favourable attitude existed towards them. Such an idea was fostered by an earlier generation of gerontologists who erroneously took their cue for what they supposed to represent the past from the prevalent situation in predominantly agrarian contemporary societies. 

It was a commonplace in the immediate post-World War II period to find in what were then defined as underdeveloped societies a perceived scarcity of persons over 60, since they then constituted only 3 or 4 percent of the total population. This low proportion may have been historically unique since it was enabled by particularly rapid population growth caused by very high fertility co-existing with significant recent falls in infant mortality. Even the UN at this time was moved to suggest that any country with more than 7 percent of its population over 65 could be defined as having an ‘aged population’.

For much of the 19th century, the English elderly made up just a little over 6 percent of the population – the lowest sustained proportion for the entire period between 1541 and 2021. This relatively low proportion in the Victorian era might be thought a somewhat aberrant period against which to compare later 20th and early 21st century developments in ageing. Through much of this period fertility was high and still uncontrolled. It stands out as a distinctly ‘youthful’ phase in the demographic history of England, and one in which old people were indeed relatively rare 

A bearded old man representing old age. Stipple engraving, 19th century. Wellcome Collection.

As we proceed further back in time, those over 60 certainly were more prevalent, and accounted for slightly more than 10 percent of the population for much of the late 17th and into the early 18th centuries. This relatively high proportion of elderly persons in the population of late Stuart and early Georgian England would not be exceeded until the depression years of the 1930s, because over much of the late 18th and 19th centuries fertility was high and population growth unprecedentedly rapid.   

Ageing in England since 1901 

Fertility

For most of this period the impact of fertility decline, which had started in the 1880s, impacted notably on the age structure. The proportion of the population under age 15, which had been 35 percent in 1901, has now halved to 17 percent, and those over 60 have increased by nearly fourfold.

Following the post-World War II baby boom, the total fertility rate fell from 2.8 to 1.7 between 1960 and 1980, reducing the size of the cohorts entering the base of the population pyramid. Although that rate rose after 1980, it did so only slightly, and has been on a plateau in recent years of c.1.9 births, still markedly below the rates found in the immediate post-war years.

While the surge of births in the post-war baby boom temporarily restrained population ageing, survivors from those large birth cohorts are now helping to increase the proportions of those over 60 quite markedly.  

Mortality

Mortality began to fall from the 1870s, but this fall was not shared equally across all age groups. It started in the 1-40 age group and was followed by those under the age of 1 after 1910. By 1950, mortality among persons aged over 60 was still more than 50 percent of what it had been in the decade before World War I. 

John Daubeny, a centenarian, holding a 1 year old boy. Photograph, ca. 1922. Wellcome Collection.

Following World War II, mortality rates among the elderly did experience falls at a greater speed than had occurred over the first half of the 20th century. Significantly, after 1980, the most rapidly increasing life chances were to be found in the oldest age groups, those over 85, leading to substantial growth in the proportional share of the very old. For the first time historically, the elderly share of the population is now being driven by mortality decline among the very oldest​.

Urbanization, migration and the geography of ageing 

In concentrating on the national proportion of those age 60 and over, we are in danger of not taking geographical variations sufficiently into account, and particularly the impact of urbanization. Between 1650 and 1750 the national population showed little growth, staying at c. 5 million. However, over the same period London grew from 400,000 to nearly 700,000. To fuel such expansion, substantial inflows of migrants were required, since the metropolis could not grow on its own accord because of its high mortality, particularly among infants and young children.  

These migration streams, averaging 8,000 persons annually, caused significant rural depopulation, particularly in London’s hinterland, as the emigration of teenagers and young adults created communities in which the elderly substantially exceeded the 10 percent they constituted in the country at large.

This pattern was intensified by the emigration of large numbers, principally of males aged 15-30, to Ireland, the North American Middle Atlantic Colonies and the Caribbean, reaching a total of 400,000 emigrants by the century’s end.  

Emigration of the young continues to contribute to the relatively higher proportion of elderly persons in rural areas today, but the most markedly aged places are now found in coastal locations fuelled by migration of the elderly in their retirement (see Figure 2). 

Figure 2: Geographical variation in the proportion aged 65 and over, and predicted for 2039. Source: Office of National Statistics: ‘Living longer: How our population is changing and why it matters (2018).

The dependency ratio

The social and economic implications of these changes in the age structure are intriguing when account is taken of production and consumption by age. A measure commonly used when investigating this matter is the dependency ratio. We treat the dependency ratio as the number of those aged 15 and under, plus those over 60, per 1,000 people aged 15-59. As the proportions under 15 significantly exceeded those over 60, it was the younger of these two age groups that determined the overall level of dependency until the late 20th century.  

The dependency ratio assumes that children and the elderly consume the same resources as adults, but do not produce resources by working. Since the early 20th century, when full-time education for the young and retirement for the elderly excluded most of these age groups from the work force, this has been largely true.

A woman with knitting in her hands is looking down on a small child in a cart. Process print after H. von Herkomer, 1877. Source: Wellcome Collection.

However, the same cannot be said of the more distant past, and changes in both consumption and working patterns can exaggerate the economic consequences of certain changes in the age structure. For instance, children and old people in the more distant past both consumed less than adults, and many also worked, thereby contributing to production. Variations in the labour-force participation of women add more complications.  

Overall changes in the age structure of the population affected the balance between production and consumption less than is suggested by the dependency ratio alone. 

Ageing and early industrialisation 

Changes in age structure did, however, have significant implications for living standards. The higher the dependency ratio, the greater the negative impact on living standards

Josephus Laurentius Dyckmans, ‘Vieille femme en priere’. Williamson Art Gallery &; Museum.

The younger the population, the greater the proportion of consumption directed to agrarian products needed to meet dietary requirements, and the smaller the proportion produced of non-agricultural goods.

The highest dependency ratio was found in 1826, when it reached 857 in a period of particularly high fertility. The result was that in the first half of the 19th century the ratio of dependents to adults was unfavourable for per capita wellbeing. 

In 1826, those under 15 accounted for 40 percent of population, whereas in 1671 they were only 28 percent. (The lowest dependency ratio was found in 1671, with a ratio of 624 in a period of low fertility and relatively high infant and child mortality.)

The 50 to 75 years before the start of the industrial revolution therefore possessed a favourable age structure for living standards, notwithstanding the relatively high proportions over 60.  

This may help to explain why recent research in Campop has shown the 17th century to have exhibited dramatic declines in the proportion of the male population working in agriculture, and a remarkable growth in the size of the secondary sector. Between 1600 and 1700, at a time when the working population had the fewest dependents, male shares in agricultural employment dropped from 67 percent to 44 percent, and secondary sector jobs rose from 29 to 43 percent of all male employment.  

Social and welfare implications  

While the economic impact of age structural changes in the English past were significant, there were also social implications.   

During the period when the over-60s constituted 10 percent of the population, the burden of care of the elderly would largely have fallen upon the 25-59 age group who then had substantially fewer children to support. This burden of care for the elderly was substantially greater in the late 17th century than in the 19th century, even though the dependency ratio was much lower in the earlier period.

Although many of the old lived as married couples in their own household or alone, very few could have retired completely and often received money from other sources, or care from their children, charities or parish funds as they became increasingly unable to work. 

Jan Gossaert, ‘An Elderly Couple’. The National Gallery, London.

Resources available to support the elderly in the late 17th and early 18th centuries reached a peak when proportions in the elderly age groups were at a maximum but the consolidated claims of the young were relatively low. The elderly were then far from being scarce in number, particularly in rural and small-town communities where the majority of the population still resided. The extent to which a significant resource transfer to the elderly in this period was achieved, whether within the family or from non-familial institutions, will be considered in a forthcoming blog. 

Further reading

Paul Johnson and Jane Falkingham, Ageing and Economic Welfare (Sage, London; 1992). 

Peter Laslett, A Fresh Map of Life: The Emergence of the Third Age 2nd ed. (Macmillan, London; 1996). 

E.A. Wrigley and R.S. Schofield, The Population History of England 1541-1971: A reconstruction, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 1989), chapter 10. 

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How dangerous was childbirth in the past?

Thursday, September 19th, 2024

Alice Reid

It is not unreasonable to believe that childbirth in the past was terribly dangerous. This view is common among popular history blogs and even some academic articles. Several internet sources, when discussing maternal mortality, state that in medieval or early modern times, as many as one in three women died during their childbearing years. 

A poor woman in childbirth being watched by her husband. Engraving by J. J. Frilley, 1827, after Ary Scheffer. Image credit: Wellcome Collection.

If one in three women died in childbirth it would indeed be a terrifying prospect, but although childbirth did come with substantially higher risk than today, childbirth was never the most common cause of mortality among adult women. 

Between 2020 and 2022 in the UK, around 13 women died during or following pregnancy out of every 100,000 pregnant women, equivalent to a risk of .013 percent or 1.3 per 10,000. This measure is known as the ‘maternal mortality ratio’.

How much higher was this risk in the past?  

The graph below shows that in the middle of the 17th century, at its highest level, maternal mortality was 170 per 10,000 (or 1.7 percent of women). Across the main pre-industrial period, average maternal mortality was 120 per 10,000 or 1.2 percent. During the 19th and early 20th centuries it was around 50 per 10,000 or 0.5 percent (although as explained below, this is likely to be an underestimate).  

Even as far back as the medieval period, evidence from elite women suggests that maternal mortality was no higher than 1.2 percent.  

The risk of childbirth-associated death was therefore far greater in the past than it is today, but does this mean that childbirth was terribly dangerous? It can be very difficult to assess what a particular risk expressed in percentage terms actually means (particularly when women might experience repeated childbirths and therefore repeated risks), so it can be helpful to think about this in different ways. One strategy is to look at the lifetime risk of maternal mortality, and another compares the risk of maternal mortality to the risks of other forms of mortality faced by women of childbearing age. 

Lifetime risk of maternal mortality 

Gerhard Marcks. A skeleton as Death embraces a pregnant woman (1959). Wellcome Collection.

The lifetime risk of maternal mortality takes account of the fact that many women have several children, and so face the risk of maternal mortality more than once. It is not a simple calculation, as it needs to take account of the risk of surviving the last birth and the chance of another pregnancy as well as the risk of dying in childbirth. In the overall period between 1550 and 1800, the lifetime risk for a married woman was about 5.6 percent, or one in 18 married women dying (because not every woman married, the risk of any woman dying in childbirth will be a bit lower) 

For reference, this is just a little lower than the lifetime risk of maternal mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa in the year 2000 (one maternal death per 16 women), but a lot higher than that for Europe in 2000 (one in 2,400 women). One in 18 married women dying in childbirth may sound quite high, but it is the same as saying that 94 percent of married women did not die in childbirth: the vast majority of women survived, despite repeated exposure to the risk 

Comparisons with deaths from other causes 

Alongside maternal mortality, women of childbearing age also faced the dangers of accidents and diseases, which were also much higher in the past than they are today. Over the pre-industrial period as a whole, the risk of a woman dying in childbirth, or the 6-8 weeks following it, was similar to the chance of dying from a non-maternal cause over the course of a year. Because women did not face the risk of childbirth every year, only around one in ten deaths to married women between the ages of 15 and 49 would have been due to childbirth. Childbirth was therefore far from the dominant cause of death, and women had far more reason to fear dying from a different cause. 

Nevertheless, it is likely that women did approach childbirth with trepidation. The risk of dying from other causes was dependent on uncontrollable, random, and often sudden factors such as the occurrence of an accident or contracting an illness.  

Once pregnant, however, the risk of childbirth was both inescapable and highly concentrated in time. Although comparable to other mortality risk over the course of a year, during the birth and the following few weeks a woman faced around six times her normal risk of death. A fear of death during childbirth is therefore not incompatible with the fact that the vast majority of women survived childbirth and that childbirth was a relatively minor form of mortality among adult women. 

Trends and social differentials 

The risks of childbirth were not static across time, or between social groups. Maternal mortality rose a little from the late 16th century, peaked in the mid-17th century, underwent a sustained fall to the early 19th century and then plateaued until another sharp fall in the mid-20th century. This last fall has been uncontroversially attributed to the introduction of sulphonamides and antibiotics in the 1940s, which allowed safer caesarean section and infection control. The earlier trends are less easy to explain, with some arguing for the quality of obstetric care and others favouring deteriorations and improvements in underlying maternal health as the key explanatory factor.  

Mignon F. Baldwin Griffith, ‘Devotion after Childbirth‘. Image credit: Amgueddfa Cymru, National Museum Wales.

Given the importance of both the quality of care at the birth and the underlying health of the mother, it is surprising that most privileged members of British society, the peerage, had higher maternal mortality than the general population until the early 20th century. The explanation lies in the fact that the elite were more likely to have been attended by doctors in childbirth, who were more likely to actively assist in the delivery, often unnecessarily and always with the risk of introducing infection 

However, the parallel reduction in risk between the elite and the wider population until 1837 suggests that changes in obstetric care were not responsible for trends in maternal mortality in this period (obstetric care, midwifery training and birth outcomes will be returned to in a future blog). Maternal mortality trends run parallel to trends in general mortality until the mid-19th century, and this indicates that changes over this period were driven by changes in the underlying health of women. It was likely that changes in women’s health was affected more by changes in exposure to epidemic disease (which was likely to have affected everyone) than by changes in the quality or quantity of dietary intake (which was likely to have affected social groups differently). 

Why is it tempting to think that death in childbirth must have been higher? 

There are several reasons why it is so tempting to think that death in childbirth must have been terribly high in the past. Some of these have already been hinted at above. Firstly, although maternal mortality was not a major killer, the risk was concentrated into relatively short space of time and was inescapable once a woman became pregnant. There were few other foreseeable events which carried such clear and focused danger.  

Secondly, the heightened risk of elite women has also been highlighted. As such women are much better documented, examples of their maternal mortality can make it seem more ubiquitous than it was. In addition, the fact that since the end of the 19th century there has been a clear social gradient in most forms of mortality makes it tempting to think that maternal mortality among non-elite women in the past would have been even higher. The emergence of the social gradient in mortality will be addressed in a future blog. 

Luke Fildes, “Motherless” (1914).

Finally, literature is full of maternal mortality: this useful plot device removes a character and places a surviving child into a challenging environment which provides a good opportunity for an interesting narrative. It has been used in relation to both heroes and villains, from Dickens (Oliver Twist’s mother) to J.K. Rowling (Lord Voldemort’s mother). 

In the 19th century the ubiquity of the device was already so well recognised that in her satirical novel Northanger Abbey, Jane Austen wrote of her main character: “No one who had ever seen Catherine Morland in her infancy would have supposed her born to be a heroine. Her situation in life, the character of her father and mother… were all equally against her… Her mother was a woman of useful plain sense, with a good temper, and, what is more remarkable, with a good constitution. She had three sons before Catherine was born; and instead of dying in bringing the latter into the world, as anybody might expect, she still lived on.” 

Why is maternal mortality so hard to measure? 

The WHO defines a maternal death as the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of the end of a pregnancy (usually a birth), from causes directly related to pregnancy or childbirth (such as post-partum haemorrhage or puerperal fever) – termed direct maternal deaths, or from a cause which could have been aggravated by the pregnancy (such as tuberculosis or heart disease) – termed indirect maternal deaths, but excluding accidental or incidental causes of death. This means that measurements of maternal mortality depend on knowing which women were pregnant or recently delivered, as well as knowing the cause of death. Many death certificates now have tick-boxes to indicate a current or recent pregnancy, but this was not the case in the past. 

For historic periods, two main strategies have been used to generate maternal mortality ratios. 

For the pre-civil registration period, many maternal deaths can be identified by linking the baptisms of children with the burials of their mothers. However, this misses maternal deaths among women whose children died before baptism, or were stillborn. It also misses women who died while pregnant, without delivering a child.  

Pioneering work was carried out at Campop by Roger Schofield to inflate observed deaths depending on the average time to baptism, the likely rates of stillbirth, and the risk of dying un-delivered, and to deflate for accidental deaths. His inflation and deflation factors were informed by detailed analysis of maternal mortality in Sweden, which had a similar demographic profile but much better data, and were subjected to careful testing. The results were reassuringly similar to maternal mortality levels and trends in a range of other European locations. Maternal mortality in both the wider population until 1837 and in the peerage was calculated using this method, by Roger Schofield and Jim Oeppen respectively. 

Arthur Stocks, “Motherless“, 1883. Walker Art Gallery.

For the period from the introduction of cause of death registration in England and Wales in 1837, and Scotland in 1855, the number of deaths are published by age, sex, and cause. The maternal mortality ratios for the period from 1850 onwards in the graph above and for the UK will be dominated by the larger population in England and Wales, where maternal mortality included direct causes of maternal death only. One might expect this method to yield an accurate assessment of maternal mortality, but work at Campop indicates that the true maternal mortality ratio in the UK between 1850 and 1930 could be up to twice the reported figure.  

Alice Reid and Eilidh Garrett used a rare set of Scottish civil registers for the second half of the 19th century to compare maternal deaths identified by linking a birth and death of the mother, with maternal deaths identified through the cause written on the death certificate. The exercise revealed that up to 30 percent of maternal deaths could not be identified as maternal through the cause alone. Instead of writing ‘post-partum haemorrhage’ or ‘puerperal peritonitis’ doctors might just write ‘haemorrhage’ or ‘peritonitis.  

English and Welsh maternal mortality is also underestimated because it only included direct maternal causes and not indirect causes. The Scottish exercise reveals that the latter could form up to 40 percent of all mortality 

Hence the real maternal mortality ratio for England and Wales could be up to twice that reported. However, making a blanket adjustment is not easy, as the Scottish exercise showed that underestimation depended on the proportion of causes of death certified by doctors and underlying mortality. Paradoxically, causes of death offered by a nextofkin could be more accurately allocated to maternal or non-maternal causes as they were often simply ‘childbed’, and underestimation was therefore greater where there were more doctors. 

Georges de la Tour, “The Newborn” (c.1640-1649).

Urban areas, where background mortality was higher, had considerably higher indirect maternal mortality. Therefore, the extent that the official maternal mortality needs to be inflated will depend on medical provision, practices of medical recording, and on background mortality and these will have changed over time as well as varied between town and countryside. 

On the other hand, the UK maternal mortality ratio uses the numbers of live births as a denominator rather than the total number of birth events, as stillbirths were not recorded until 1927. This is likely to inflate the ratio and to some extent balances the underestimation already discussed. 

A couple of lessons can be learnt from this: firstly, levels of reported maternal mortality can vary with the levels of medical services due to reporting practices, and this can complicate comparisons over space or across time. Secondly, using maternal mortality as an indicator of the coverage and quality of health services is likely to be flawed 

Further reading 

Galley, Chris, and Alice Reid. “Sources and Methods Maternal Mortality.” Local Population Studies 93.1 (2014): 68-78. 

Loudon, Irvine (2000). “Maternal mortality in the past and its relevance to developing countries today”, The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 72(1): 241S-246S, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcn/72.1.241S 

Podd R (2020). “Reconsidering maternal mortality in medieval England: aristocratic Englishwomen, c. 1236–1503”. Continuity and Change 35(2):115-137. doi:10.1017/S0268416020000156 

Reid, Alice and Eilidh Garrett (2018). “Medical provision and urban-rural differences in maternal mortality in late nineteenth century Scotland.” Social Science & Medicine 201: 35-43. 

Schofield, Roger (1986) ‘Did mothers really die? Three centuries of maternal mortality in “the world we have lost’’’, in L. Bonfield, R. Smith and K. Wrightson (eds) The World We Have Gained: Histories of Population and Social Structure (Oxford): 231–60  

Smith, Richard and Jim Oeppen (2006). “Place and status as determinants of infant mortality in England c. 1550-1837″, in E. Garrett, C. Galley, N. Shelton and R. Woods (eds) Infant Mortality: A Continuing Social Problem (Ashgate): 53-78. 

Wrigley, E. A., R. S. Davies, J. E. Oeppen and R. S. Schofield (1997) English Population History from Family Reconstitution (CUP). pp. 307–21. 

Three score and ten?

Thursday, August 15th, 2024

Romola Davenport & Jim Oeppen

Campop’s studies of mortality suggest that, in England, average life expectancy at birth varied between 35 and 40 years in the centuries between 1600 and 1800It is a common misconception that, when life expectancy was so low, there must have been very few old peopleIn fact, the most common age for adult deaths was around 70 years, in line with the Biblical three score years and ten. So what does life expectancy actually measure?

George Paul Chalmers, “An Old Woman”, National Galleries of Scotland.

What is life expectancy?

To understand life expectancy, we can imagine a group of 1,000 babies born at the same time. We can measure how long each one lives. Figure 1 shows the lifespans for these infants as horizontal bars that indicate the length of life, arranged from top to bottom in order of lifespan. Their lifespans follow the pattern of mortality in England in 1841.   

Figure 1. Lengths of life and percent remaining alive of 1,000 babies born into a hypothetical population in England and Wales in 1841. Source: Human Mortality Database.

As you can see, in 1841 a lot of children died in the first five years of life. Of 1,000 babies, 138 (nearly 14 percent) died before reaching their first birthday. By age five, over a quarter of the original 1,000 babies were dead.  

However, after the first five years, the rate of attrition eased. Children who made it to their fifth birthday had a 50:50 chance of making it to their 60th birthday. Of the original 1,000 babies, 38 percent survived to age 60, and nearly 10 percent to age 80.  

So why was life expectancy only 42 in 1841? Because life expectancy is the average of all the different lengths of lives in the population. When mortality is high in infancy and childhood, then many of these lives are very short, and these many short lives really bring down the average age at death.  

Richard Tennant Cooper, “A Ghostly Skeleton Trying to Strangle a Sick Child; Representing Diphtheria”. Image: Wellcome Collection.

Calculating life expectancy 

To calculate life expectancy, we take all the ages at which people died, add them up, and then divide by the number of people. For example, if we had a ‘population’ of two people, one of whom died on their first birthday and the other who died on their 100th birthday, their average life expectancy would be their ages at death added together and divided by two (101/2 = an average life expectancy of 50.5 years). But neither individual died in their 50s, or anywhere near their 50s. The average is not a good indicator of mortality risk in this case, because the length of life is so variable in this population.  

On the other hand, if we have a population of two people, one of whom died on their 80th birthday and the other on their 100th, then average life expectancy would be 90 years, a much more representative estimate of average years lived. The latter case is much more like most populations in the world today. As life expectancy has risen, the benefits have been felt first at younger ages, and death has become increasingly concentrated in late adulthood 

Changing life expectancy over time 

In the early 1600s (the first period for which we can calculate life expectancy in the English population) there was a huge peak of deaths in infancy, but then deaths were strung out across the whole life course between birth and 110 years of age. That is, the length of life was very unpredictable in the 1600s, and the risk of death was fairly high at all ages. 

David des Granges, “The Saltonstall Family”, c.1636–7. The painting has been interpreted as depicting Sir Richard Saltonshall and his two wives and children. His first wife Elizabeth Basse, in the bed, died in 1630 leaving two young children, and Richard married Mary Parker in 1633. Image credit: Tate.

By 1800, this pattern had begun to shift. Mortality had become more concentrated at the oldest and youngest ages. In personal terms, this meant that fewer young children experienced the loss of their parents, fewer young adults were widowed, and fewer elderly parents experienced the untimely deaths of their adult children.  

By the 1960s, deaths in childhood and early adulthood were relatively rare, and most people could expect to live into their 60s, 70s or 80s. Life expectancy was around 72, and this is a much better reflection of the ages to which most people could expect to live. 

Today, when the death distribution is compressed and dominated by the adult peak, average life expectancy at birth is a much more representative statistic than in the past when the average fell between two peaks (infancy and old age). Nevertheless, most people die above the average age, and the most common age at death is almost 90

It’s a bit more complicated… 

So life expectancy is a kind of summary measure of mortality patterns in a population. It allows us to compare mortality trends over time, and between populations. But it is not a measure of the lifespan of a population, or even of the most common age at death.

Calculating life expectancy in real populations is also not quite as straightforward as we have suggested. Take the life expectancy of the English population in the 1960s. This doesn’t actually apply to the cohort of people born in 1960, because to calculate life expectancy for a real cohort we would have to wait until they were all dead in order to know how long they had lived! 

So to calculate life expectancy for the people born in 1960, we would take all the deaths that occurred in that year and use these to measure the risk of dying at each age in 1960. We then apply these risks to an imaginary population that was born in 1960 and work out the average age at which they would have died if they had faced these risks at each age. This captures the particular mortality patterns of the year 1960, and is given the technical term ‘period life expectancy’. This is what people usually mean when they refer to life expectancy.

Demographers are, however, also interested in the life expectancy of cohorts of real people. For example, we can follow cohorts with unusual experiences, such as men born in the last years of the 19th century who were of recruitment age in World War I, and compare how they fared compared with other cohorts born before and after them.

Great expectations

The modern rise in life expectancy has provided enormous social and economic benefits. Not only do we live longer, but there has been a massive reduction in uncertainty with respect to both our own lifetimes and the lifetimes of our family and friends. 

Further reading

Davenport, R.J. (2021) ‘Patterns of death, 1800 – 2020: Global rates and causes’ in P.N. Stearns (ed.) The Routledge History of Death Since 1800. Routledge. 

Wrigley, E.A., R.S. Davies, J.E. Oeppen and R.S. Schofield (1997) English Population History from Family Reconstitution. Cambridge University Press.